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Support for economic resource allocation in Application Layer Networks (such as Grids) is 
critical to allow applications and users to effectively exploit computational and data 
infrastructure as a utility. The evaluation of resource allocation strategies plays a major part in 
the selection of a resource allocation method. This paper presents an evaluation framework for 
resource allocation methods in Application Layer Networks that attempts to support both a 
technical and an economic evaluation. The model uses a layered metrics pyramid with different 
aggregation levels and statistical methods. 
On top of the pyramid, only one number, the social utility, is able to characterize an economic 
resource allocation method. This single number may serve to compare different resource 
allocation strategies. However, one can also determine values obtained for metrics at 
intermediate levels. We demonstrate using a prototype application how such a metrics pyramid 
may be deployed in reality, focusing on the implementation of the lower levels of the pyramid. 
1 Introduction 
An Application Layer Network (ALN) describes an abstraction that integrates different overlay 
network approaches, like Grid and Peer-2-Peer systems on top of the physical connectivity 
provided by the Internet. A common characteristic of ALNs is the redundant, distributed 
provisioning and access to data, computation or application services, while hiding the 
heterogeneity of the service and resource network from the user. One of the main issues in the 
development of future ALNs is the efficient exploitation of services and resources available in 
the network. 
A key requirement of ALNs is to support scalable, dynamic, and adaptable allocation 
mechanisms. This issue is being addressed by a number of Grid and P2P projects such as 
Globus [FoKe97], Legion [CKKG99], Nimrod/G [BuAG00], CATNETS [EACC05], and 
Gnutella [AdHu00]. Although considerable progress has been made developing software 
architectures and allocation methods, which allow clients to obtain services “on demand”, the 
evaluation of these methods with respect to each other is rarely undertaken. What is missing is a 
standard set of metrics that could be used as the basis for such an evaluation. It is important that 
such metrics allow comparison of both the application “behaviour”, along with the 
infrastructure behaviour. 
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Currently, no metric framework exists that takes into account the characteristics of applications 
that may be deployed over ALNs – especially ones that measure the performance of the 
resource allocation strategy being used. Current Grid and Peer-2-Peer applications often use a 
service-oriented architecture, which is characterized by dynamic and heterogeneous resources. 
In such environments one of the key issues is the assignment of resources to services.  This 
paper assumes that resource allocation is being undertaken in a “market” based environment – 
allowing service users and providers to sell and buy services and resources [ReSE06]. It is also 
assumed that two concurrent markets co-exist – a “resource market” and a “service market”. A 
service instance can be provisioned by different possible, even heterogeneous resources; this 
heterogeneity, however, is shielded from the user, who acquires services on a virtualized, 
homogeneous service market. The presence of a market allows to use economic concepts with 
reference to the allocation strategy being adopted [ENRS06], e.g. different auction types, 
bilateral bargaining, market-oriented programming or computable genereal equilibrium 
approaches. 
The characteristics of e.g. Grid and P2P applications in ALNs define particular resource 
allocation requirements which have the following characteristics [MoBa03]: 
• Dynamicity: There are changing environments and there is a need for adaptation to 
changes. 
• Diversity: Requests may have different priorities and responses should be assigned 
according to them. It is therefore possible for a number of different types of requests to 
co-exist, and determine how these should be handled becomes significant. 
• Large scale: There are often a large number of nodes, and it is often necessary to group 
these elements to create hierarchical organisations. 
• Partial knowledge: It is not possible to determine at any point in time the full state of the 
system or network. 
• Complexity: Learning mechanisms are necessary to adapt to changes in infrastructure, 
and optimal solutions are not easily computable. 




The goal of the evaluation framework presented here is to define a general set of metrics for 
performance analysis, which can be used in projects evaluating and comparing the performance 
of resource allocation mechanisms running in network exhibiting the above characteristics. 
Such a framework should include both technical parameters (such as quality of service factors – 
like response time) and economic parameters (such as overall cost of computation or data 
access), to compare different resource allocation methods with each other. 
 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the metrics used for the evaluation 
framework. Section 3 discusses how these metrics may be used for a technical and economical 
evaluation. A demonstration of the approach using a Grid prototype application is presented in 
Section 4, and a summary of the approach is provided in Section 5. 
2 The Metrics Pyramid 
It is often useful to be able to compare two allocation methods using a single index or number. 
Such an index provides an aggregated behaviour of an allocation method with reference to a 
number of features. The application of statistics is necessary to achieve the index, but is useful 
only in conjunction with a detailed measurement framework. The results of the measurement 
are intended to allow providing feedback on system behaviour, improve chances of successful 
adaptation, improve implementation, and increase accountability. 
Figure 1 shows the logical structure of data and indices. It sums up the underlying methodology 
establishing the shape of a pyramid. Data are the basic units of information, collected through 
technical monitoring of the application layer network. Parameters which are likely to be of 
significance within the application and the resource allocation mechanism have to be selected 
for measurement. These parameters define the raw disaggregated data. To ease the analysis of 
the raw data, they are collected from different experiments (simulation runs) into a database. 
Disaggregated indicators provide the first stage of evaluation, and may comprise of a number of 
independently measured values. They help to improve the implementation of the resource 
allocation mechanisms. 
For further evaluation, it is obligatory to take into account a set of characteristics that are not 
directly comparable because these characteristics correspond to variables of different 
dimensions and unit of measurement. Thus, they have to be made comparable, e.g. by 
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normalization, and then grouped into indicators. An indicator is defined as a ratio (a value on a 
scale of measurement) derived from a series of observed facts, which can reveal relative 
changes as a function of time. They provide feedback on system behaviour and also allow the 
analysis of performance and predictions of future performance. 
















Figure 1: General method to obtain a composite index [PiZC00] 
 
Finally, the simple and composite indices are computed, which represent performance 
benchmarks. They express information in ways that are directly relevant to the decision-making 
process. In general, indicators help the assessment, the evaluation, and most important, they 
help to improve accountability. Examples of applications using these techniques can be found in 
social sciences and in economics [Horn93][CoHR95][UNDP99].  
Although highly aggregated indices are attractive because of their simplicity, they also carry 
risks. Most of all, aggregates tend to mask real-life complexity and detail for policy-making. 
Highly aggregated indices are important in giving a view of overall progress, but they should be 
readily disaggregated into its components that may help to specify reasons for the index going 
up or down and also answer questions of interest to decision-makers working on lower scales. 
The pyramid with its different layers supports this analysis progress, it enables both analysis at 











































































































































































































































Figure 2: Metrics Pyramid 
 
To support both technical and economic parameters, the evaluation process is divided into two 
layers. The first uses basic statistical concepts, while the second uses economic principles. The 
technical parameters, at the lower end of this pyramid, provide the basis for economic 
parameters that lie higher up in the pyramid, as illustrated in figure 2. A prerequisite is, that the 
key parameters at the bottom layer can be technically measured in the system to be analysed.  
Aggregate indices may be generated out of several of these low level parameters. The 
parameters at the higher layers of the pyramid have economic semantics and therefore a higher 
significance. At the top of the pyramid there is a composite index defined as (global) “social 
utility” – providing a single metric to specify the overall performance of the allocation strategy 
being used in a particular application.  
The selection of the technical parameters, and their aggregation to simple and composite 
indicators, can vary, depending on the resource allocation method and/or the measurable 
technical metrics of the application domain. The framework gives the possibility to add and 
remove metrics to optimize the framework for a special application domain without changing 
the general concepts used to build up this pyramid.  
3 Technical and economical metrics 
This section defines and illustrates various layers and aggregation steps of the metrics pyramid, 
(cf. figure 2), as used in the project CATNETS [EACC05] to analyse centralized and 
decentralized economic resource allocation methods. 
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The approach to technical metrics focuses on providing generic, easy to measure parameters, 
which can subsequently be aggregated. Technical layer metrics can be classified into: (I) 
efficiency measures (e.g. number of requests, number of acceptances); (II) utility measures (e.g. 
agent satisfaction); (III) time metrics (e.g. discovery time, negotiation time, service provisioning 
time) which are measures of the rate of change of market processes; and message-based metrics 
(IV) to measure the activity of users to communicate to find resources and services. The 
technical metrics include: 
• Number of Requests: This metric measures demand, counted as the number of requests 
for services and resources. 
• Number of Acceptance: The number of acceptance measures successfully requested 
(acknowledged) services and resources.  
• Agent Satisfaction: The individual agent satisfaction measures the utility gain of a single 
transaction, which is the distance between his lowest price willing to pay in this 
transaction and the final price of the agreement. It is defined as the ratio between the 
subjective reservation value and transaction price.  
• Discovery Time: This metric is used to measure the time to find a set of possible 
negotiation partners. 
• Negotiation Time: The negotiation time measures the time needed to finish the 
negotiation between one buyer and one or several sellers. The measurement of the 
negotiation time starts after service discovery has completed, and ends before service 
provisioning. 
• Service Provisioning Time (Effective Job Execution Time): The evaluation framework 
defines the service provisioning time as the service usage time of one transaction. It 
optionally includes also setup times, etc. 
• Hops: The number of hops describes the distance between a service consumer and a 
service provider, counting the number of hops a message needs to traverse between 
them (this may be averaged over all the messages exchanged between a consumer and a 
provider).  
• Message Latency: The message latency measures the time a message needs to arrive at 
the communication partner. Message latency is a parameter that indicates the 
performance of the physical network link and its message routing capabilities. It is 
expected that a large distance (cf. also number of hops) between a service consumer and 
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service provider should lead to higher message latency. Whether hops or latency is used 
to measure distance should be decided casually. 
• Message Size: This metric is used to measure the message size (e.g. in kilobytes). 
• Number of Messages: This value counts the number of messages needed for service 
allocation. The traffic on a physical network link could be computed by multiplying the 
message size with the number of messages sent. 
These metrics are then used in two aggregation steps, as described below. 
3.1 Simple indicators first aggregation 
This layer defines a set of independent metrics which are normalized between 0.0 and 1.0. This 
makes it easier to find valid functions for the layers above, such as on demand availability and 
infrastructure cost. The technical metrics may be combined to obtain a framework that enables 
evaluation of different service oriented architectures. The aggregated metrics at the simple 
indicator layer are: 
• Allocation Rate: This metric is a measure of the efficiency of the allocation process, 
which is computed using the number of requests and number of accepts. A buyer can 
demand services, but there is no guarantee that the allocation mechanism (centralized or 
decentralized exchange) performs a match between demand and supply. 
allocation_rate = accepts/requests 
• Agent Satisfaction: This metric implicitly shows the average surplus of the service 
provider or user (agent) in the system (normalized to the interval 0.0 and 1.0). A low 
value means that an agent has not been able to complete its goals successfully during the 
negotiation process. A high value means that the agent can constitute good results 
satisfying its requirements. 
• Access Time: This indicator evaluates the time needed from the starting point of 
discovery until the final delivery of the service. 
access_time = discovery_time + negotiation_time + provisioning_time 
• Job Execution Overhead: This is the additional time needed for negotiation. It refers to 
the overhead introduced during the service negotiation process. The overhead is the sum 
of the service access time and the resource access time. 
job_execution_overhead = access_time_service + access_time_resource 
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• Distance between Contract Partners: Message latency is the messaging time incurred by 
agents, and it is proportional to the distance between the sending and receiving nodes. 
The latter would be the ratio between the actual distance and the maximum distance 
between agents. 
• Service/Resource Usage: The network usage will be evaluated by the ratio between 
provisioning time and the total simulation time. This evaluation would be conducted for 
both services and resources. 
service_usage = provisioning_time / simulation_time 
resource_usage = provisioning_time / simulation_time 
• Network Usage: This metric is used to measure the total number of messages exchanged 
between two agents. 
3.2 Composite indicators - second aggregation 
Composite indicators are an aggregation of simple indicators, and are closer in scope to the 
application than to the infrastructure. Simple indicators are normalized between a [0; 1] interval 
in order to be comparable with each other. From the economics perspective, composite 
indicators measure the benefit from exchange (on-demand availability), and costs incurred from 
activities in the market (infrastructure costs). An optimal allocation mechanism would have an 
on-demand availability value = 1, and infrastructure costs = 0. 
On DeMand availability (ODM) is a composite indicator obtained as mean of simple indicators, 
and may be derived as: 
ODM = 1/3 (allocation_rate + agent_satisfaction + job_execution_overhead) 
Infrastructure Cost (IC) is calculated in the same way. It is also a mean of multiple simple 
indicators, and may be derived as: 
IC = 1/4 (distance + service_usage + resource_usage + network_usage) 
It may be possible to model some of these metrics as stochastic variables, giving a mean and 
standard deviation over which the given metric varies. In economic applications, variance 
would be a measure for the overall “risk” to achieve stability of a given metric development. 
3.3 The social utility - a composite index 
To be able to use economic concepts into the evaluation process, a virtual policy maker is 
introduced, who aims to optimize the allocation. The behaviour of the policy maker is described 
with a goal function which is to be minimized under some constraints. The constraints are 
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determined by the structure of the economy, i.e. the underlying laws of the economy. The policy 
maker does not have complete knowledge of the economy, but uses a model of the economy 
based on statistical cause-and-effect relations. The policy maker collects all the metrics from the 
previous layer, has some preferences about ODM and IC and is aware about the distribution of 
profits and costs. Analogies exist in macroeconomic theory, and are used here with regard to 
two related models: Barro Gordon [BaGo83] and Poole [Pool70]. 
Mapping these models to the evaluation framework leads to the goal of improving the utility of 
society and simultaneously lowering the fluctuation in the economy. If the policy maker 
minimizes the inverse ODM and IC by reducing the distance to zero of those variables (optimal 
values), the social utility is improved. Moreover, he knows that inverse ODM and IC are 
distributed across the population (i.e. he knows the statistical moments of those variables) in a 
sense that he looks at the distribution of benefits and costs over the agents. A result of the final 
optimization rule is that the policy maker is interested in minimizing inequality (measured with 
respect to the metrics defined previously) between agents. 
In order to follow this approach for ALNs, a loss function is built using the composite indicators 
ODM and IC. ODM and IC are taken as stochastic variables and their distribution across a 
population (the set of service users and providers) by the first and second moments are 
considered. Renaming the variables for the presentation X (inverse on demand availability 
index) and Y (costs index), the ALN loss function is  
])()([ 2*2* YYXXEL −+−= βα , 
where α  and β  are weights and *X  and *Y  are target values. It is important to give a value to 
the targets. As X is the inverse of the On Demand Availability it can be concluded that a lower 
value of X is better for the policy maker. Thus, the target value is set equal to zero ( *X = 0). Y is 
a direct measure of costs so it is natural to choose zero also for this variable ( *Y = 0). With this 
target, the loss function is  
][ 22 YXEL βα +=  
The random variables can be expressed as 
uX X += μ  and zY Y += μ , 
where u and z are random variables with zero means and positive variances ( 0=uμ , 0=zμ , 
02 >uσ , 0
2 >zσ ). Note that variances 
2
uσ  and 
2
zσ  are the variance across a population. 
Subsequently, the final social utility index may be specified as: 
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zYuXL βσβμασαμ +++= . 
So one possibility for evaluating ALNs is to make use of: 
2222min zYuX βσβμασαμ +++ . 
This means that for the final evaluation of the scenarios, the first and second moments of ODM 
and IC have to be evaluated, whereas the first moment is the mean of ODM and IC, and second 
moment the variance of ODM and IC. In fact a policy maker has preference to minimize the 
inverse of ODM, thereby leading to the minimization of costs and the minimization of 
variability, i.e. the fair distribution of social utility between agents. 
Applying the depicted metrics pyramid, a layered evaluation of different resource allocation 
methods is possible. The Grid application prototype, which is illustrated in the next section, 
uses the pyramid for a first evaluation of different scenarios. The focus of the evaluation is to 
show the relevance of this pyramid when being applied to a real Grid application prototype.  
4 The Application Prototype 
4.1 Application prototype description 
The proof-of-concept prototype has been developed and named Catallaxy Data Mining (Cat-
DataMining) [JPBG04]. Figure 3 shows the prototype components and related software agents 
as buyers and sellers in the Grid service market and Grid resource market. The prototype is 
composed of four main components: the Master Grid Service (MGS) – a Complex Service 
requestor; the Catallactic Access Point (CAP) – the entry point to the Complex Services for the 
Master Grid Service; the Data Mining Services – as types of Complex and Basic Services (BS); 
and job execution resources – as computational resources. The Complex Service (CS) agent 
acting on request of the MGS is the buyer entity in the service market, and the Basic Service is 




Figure 3: Cat-DataMining prototype – the Catallactic agents and the markets – one service invocation 
 
The BS consists of a data mining job execution environment, which offers the deployment of 
multiple “slaves” able to execute the data mining task. Within the Cat-DataMining prototype, 
the data mining BS needs to be able to provide a response time as an important characteristic. 
With this goal the data mining BS agent buys resources in the resource market. Resource seller 
entities are able to provide a set of resources via the Local Resource Manager (LRM). The 
Resource Agents act on behalf of these Local Resource Managers, and provide an interface to 
the physical resources they manage. 
The data mining BS agent is the buyer entity in the resource market, and the LRM agents are 
the seller entity on the resource market. The main functionalities of BS agents at the resource 
market are: (I) co-allocation of resources (resource bundles) by parallel negotiation with 
different resource providers (local resource manager entities); (II) informing the Complex 
Service about the outcome of resource negotiation. 
4.2 Test-beds and preliminary results 
We have performed several experiments in a cluster with the current version of the middleware, 
allowing for a preliminary performance assessment of the Grid Market Middleware (GMM) 
developed in the CATNETS project [JRCC06]. The goal of the experiments is to evaluate the 
autonomic behaviour of the GMM in terms of self-organisation, given by decentralized resource 
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discovery, and in terms of self-optimisation, given by adaptation to load and capacity of the 
resources. 
For these experiments we have used for the economic agents an implementation of the ZIP 
(Zero Intelligence Plus) agents [PrTo98] which use a gradient algorithm to set the price for 
resources. Clients initiate negotiations with a price lower than the available budget. If they are 
not able to buy at that price, they will increase their bids until either they win or reach the 
budget limit.  
Services will start selling the resources at a price which is solely influenced by the node's 
utilization, following the pricing model presented in [YeBu04]. As services get involved in 
negotiations, the price will also be influenced by demand. If a service agent is selling its 
resources, it will increase the price, when resources are sold to identify the price the market is 
willing to pay. When it no longer sells, it will lower the price until it becomes competitive again 
or it reaches a minimum price defined by the current utilization of the resource.  
In order to test the performance of the market based resource allocation mechanism, we setup 
controlled experiments deploying several instances of the middleware in a Linux server farm. 
Each node has 2 CPU Intel PIII 1 GHz and 512 MB of memory. The nodes in the farm are 
connected by an internal Ethernet network at 100Mbs.  
 
Figure 4: Experiment Setup 
 
We deploy GMM and the Web Services on six nodes (named arvei-{7…12}). On each node we 
also deployed a Web Service which performs a CPU intensive calculation on the machines, 
increasing load. These Web Services are exposed in a Tomcat server. Access to execute these 
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Web Services on the Resources is what will be negotiated by the Service with the Clients. 
Figure 4 shows a schematic view of this deployment.  
The experiments consisted in launching 2 Clients concurrently from 2 other nodes which were 
not running the Web Services. We generate a baseline load on all three nodes of 25% of CPU 
usage to simulate some background activity. Each Client performs 50 requests, in intervals of 
10 seconds. Whenever a Client wins a bid with a Service, it invokes the Web Service in the 
selected node. The complete experiment runs for about 10 minutes. To better test autonomic 
load balancing, we artificially stressed one of the nodes (arvei-10) up to 95-100% of CPU usage 
for a short time during the experiment. 
 
Figure 5: Experiment Results – Price and Utilisation Basic Service at node arvei12  
 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the measured results of selected nodes used in the experiment. The 
measured metric price corresponds to the agent satisfaction of the presented metrics pyramid, 
the execution time to the provisioning time, and the utilisation metric to the resource usage. The 
metric negotiation time equals the negotiation time in the metrics pyramid. Both figures show 
the same experiment time interval. High utilisation of the CPU leads to higher prices of the 
resource CPU and to higher execution times, whereas the negotiation time doesn’t significantly 
increase. Prices of the CPU are lowered time-delayed; a short increase of the utilisation 
increases the prices again. As expected, a lower utilisation of the CPU decreases the execution 
time.  
Essentially, each data for each technical metric is referring to a single transaction and it has to 
be collected by the corresponding agent. Price and utilization data are collected periodically and 
independently by each transaction, giving a number of observations whereas execution time, 
negotiation time, and allocation are a dataset of 100 observations, which are collected by the 
complex services. 
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The computation works as follows: the first price data that has been collected after the 
execution data time stamp has been considered. Repeating the above procedure for each 
execution time, an observation data set of 100 items both for price and utilization has been 
extracted.  
 
Figure 6: Experiment Results - Execution and Negotiation Time at node arvei8 
 
The first aggregation level contemplates the construction of the normalized metrics set agent 
satisfaction, access time and resource usage. Agent satisfaction and resource usage are 
normalized to the interval between 0.0 and 1.0. The access time is normalized as follows:  
)..(. timennegotiatiotimeexecutionetimeaccess +−= β   
where the weighting factor 00005.0=β  is chosen arbitrarily. The on demand availability is 
defined the sum of the benefit metrics access time and satisfaction and the infrastructure cost 
indicator equals the resource usage. Applying the mean and the standard deviation of both on 
demand availability and infrastructure costs (see Table 1), we obtain the final index like 
follows:  






Metric Value Metric Value 
L 0,43508 α β  0,5 
sageresource.uσ  0,32025  sageresource.uμ 0,48686 
agent.satσ  0,015615 agent.satμ  0,46295 
eaccess.timσ  0,013218  eaccess.timμ  0,080522
Table 1: Experiment Results - Final Index 
5 Conclusion 
The design of a general evaluation framework for resource allocation in ALNs has been 
presented, which consists of a set of technical and economic parameters. The parameters in the 
lower levels of the framework provide technical data, while higher level economic parameters 
could be integrated into business models for decision makers. 
However, the implementation and possible refinements of the presented concept is ongoing 
work which is not yet finalized. An exact definition about how to measure the defined metrics 
for the framework and integrate them is also ongoing work. A first implementation of the 
presented metrics framework has been discussed – work undertaken as part of the EU 
CATNETS project. This project develops a resource allocation architecture based on 
decentralized economic models, allowing resource management polices to be specified in a 
decentralized, autonomous and infrastructure independent way. The economic concepts of the 
CATNETS project uses bargaining mechanisms improving the resource allocation in 
Application Layer Networks (ALNs). An application example is used to demonstrate how 
metrics associated with the evaluation framework can be specified. 
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